The most important ancient confederacy was the association of Greek republics under the Amphityonic federal council. Historical accounts present very instructive analogies to our present Confederation of the American States.

Federal Powers, Responsibilities of Greek Council Members

2 The individual Greek city-states remained independent, sovereign states with representatives (Amphictyons) and equal votes in the federal council. The council had the authority to propose and resolve whatever it judged necessary for the common welfare of Greece: to declare and wage war, to be the last court of appeals in controversies between states, to fine the aggressing party, to employ the force of the confederacy against the disobedient, to admit new members.

The federal council was the guardian of religion and the immense riches of the temple of Delphos, where it had jurisdiction in controversies between inhabitants and those who came to consult the oracle.

To promote the efficacy of federal powers, council members took an oath to defend and protect the united cities, punish violators of this oath, and inflict vengeance on sacrilegious despoilers of the temple.

In Theory, Council's Power Sufficient

3 In theory, these powers seem sufficient. In several ways, they exceed the powers enumerated in the Articles of Confederation. For example, superstitions strengthened the Amphictyon federal government. They could use coercion against disobedient cities. And they pledged to exert this authority on necessary occasions.

In Reality, Not Enough Power

4 Nevertheless, reality was very different than the theory. The powers, like those of our Congress, were administered by deputies appointed by the member city-states as political units. Hence the weakness, disorders and, finally, the destruction of the confederacy.

The more powerful cities, instead of being in awe and subordination, tyrannized the rest. Demosthenes (b.-384 d.-322) writes that Athens was the arbiter of Greece for 73 years (c. - 477 to - 404). Sparta next governed it for 29 years. After the battle of Leuctra (-371), Thebes ruled.

Stronger States Tyrannized Weaker

5 The Greek historian Plutarch (b. 47 d. 120) wrote that the representatives of the strongest cities often threatened and corrupted those of the weaker and judgment favored the most powerful party.

Wars Didn't Even Unite City-States

6 Even during dangerous wars with Persia (- 490 to - 449) and Macedon (- 330), the member States never acted as a unit and were, more or less, eternally the dupes or hirelings of the common enemy. The intervals between foreign wars were filed with domestic vicissitudes, convulsions, and carnage.

Athenian Self-Interest

7 After the war with Persia, Sparta demanded some cities be expelled from the confederacy for being unfaithful. However, the Athenians decided they would lose more partisans than Sparta, giving the latter a majority in public. So, Athens opposed and defeated the attempt.

This piece of history proves the inefficiency of the confederacy. Ambition and jealousy motivated its most powerful members. The rest were degraded, becoming dependent. In theory, the smaller members were entitled to equal pride and majesty; in fact, they became satellites of the larger members.

Weak Federal Government; Most Danger from Other States

8 Abbe' Milot says that if the Greeks had been as wise as they were courageous, experience would have taught them the necessity of a closer union. And they would have used the peace following their success against Persia for reforms.

Instead of following this obvious coarse, Athens and Sparta, inflated by victories and glory, became rivals and then enemies. They then inflicted more mischief against each other than they had suffered from Persia. Their mutual jealousies, fears, hatreds, and injuries ended in the famous Peloponnesian war (Athens vs. Sparta, - 431 to -404), which ended in the ruin and slavery of Athens, who had begun it.

Internal Problems: Dangers from Outside

9 When a weak government is not at war, it is constantly agitated by internal dissensions that always bring fresh calamities from abroad.

After the Phocians plowed up consecrated ground at the temple of Apollo, the Amphictyonic council fined the sacrilegious offenders. The Phocians, aided by Athens and Sparta, refused to submit to the decree.

On the other side, the Thebans, with some other cities, supported the Amphictyons' authority to avenge the violated god.

Enter as Ally; Stay as Conqueror

Philip of Macedon (-343) was invited to help the Thebans. However, he'd secretly started the feud, so he gladly seized the opportunity to execute his plans against the liberties of Greece. By his intrigues and bribes, he won over the popular leaders of several cities. Their influence and votes gained his admission into the Amphictyonic council. And by his intrigues and his arms, Philip made himself master of the confederacy.

Stronger Government Might Have Repelled Macedon, Rome

10 Such were the consequences of the fallacious principle on which Greece was founded. A judicious observer of her fate says that if Greece had been united by a stricter confederation and fought to stay unified, she never would have worn the chains of Macedon. And she might have been a barrier to Rome.

Achaean League

11 The Achaean league, another society of Grecian republics, supplies valuable instruction.

Better Organized than Amphictyons

12 This union was far more intimate and organized more wisely than the preceding one. Although not exempt from a similar catastrophe, it did not equally deserve it.

Division of Governmental Authorities

13 The cities in the league retained their municipal jurisdiction, appointed their own officers, and were perfectly equal.

They were represented in the senate that had the sole and exclusive rights of: peace and war, sending and receiving ambassadors, entering into treaties and alliances, appointing a chief magistrate or praetor.

The praetor commanded their armies and, with the advice and consent of ten senators, administered the government during the senate recess and shared in its deliberations when assembled. Their primitive constitution called for two administrative praetors but in practice one was preferred.

All City-States had Same Laws

14 It appears the cities had all the same laws and customs, the same weights and measures, and the same money. But it's uncertain whether this was a federal decree. The only mandate was that cities have the same laws and usages.

As a member of the Amphictyonic confederacy, Sparta fully exercised her government and her legislation. However, when Sparta became part of the Achaean league, her ancient laws and institutions were abolished and those of the Achaeans adopted. This shows the material difference between the two systems.

If We Knew More, We'd Learn Much

15 It is too bad that a better historical record of these interesting political systems doesn't exist. If their internal structure could be studied, we would probably learn more about the science of federal government than by any of the similar experiments with which we are acquainted.

Achaean Government More Just

16 Historians who study Achaean affairs agree on one fact. Both after Aratus renovated the league and before its dissolution by Macedon, its government was infinitely more moderate and just and its citizens were less than those in any solitary city exercising all the power of a sovereignty. In his observations on Greece, Abbe' Mably says that the popular government, so tempestuous elsewhere, caused no disorders in the members of the Achaean republic, because it was tempered by the general authority and laws of the confederacy.

However, Faction Caused Problems

17 However, we shouldn't hastily conclude that faction did not agitate particular cities, or that subordination and harmony reigned. The contrary is shown in the vicissitudes and fate of the republic.

Again, Allies Became Conquerors

18 During the Amphictyonic confederacy, the less important cities of the Achaeans were minor characters in the theater of Greece. When the Achaean cities fell to Macedon, the policy of Philip II and his son, Alexander the Great, saved Greece. Their successors followed a different policy. Each city had separate interests and the union was dissolved. Some fell under the tyranny of Macedonian garrisons; others fell to usurpers within Greece.

Before long, shame and oppression awakened their love of liberty. A few cities reunited. Others followed their example as opportunities to cut off their tyrants were found. Soon the league embraced almost the whole Peloponnesus [southern peninsula of Greece]. Macedon saw its progress but internal dissensions hindered her from stopping it.

All Greece caught the enthusiasm and seemed ready to unite in one confederacy until jealousy and envy in Sparta and Athens, over the rising glory of the Achaeans, threw a fatal wrench into the enterprise. The dread of Macedonian power induced the league to court an alliance with the kings of Egypt and Syria who, as successors of Alexander, were rivals of the Macedonian king.

Ambition led Cleomenes, king of Sparta, to make an unprovoked attack on the Achaeans [- 236]. As an enemy of Macedon, Cleomenes got the Egyptian and Syrian princes to breach their engagements with the league. The Achaeans were reduced to the dilemma of submitting to Cleomenes or requesting the aid of Macedon, its former oppressor.

The Achaeans chose the aid of Macedon, who often enjoyed meddling in Greek's affairs. A Macedonian army quickly appeared and took possession of Sparta [- 221]. Cleomenes was vanquished to Egypt. But the Achaeans soon learned that a victorious and powerful ally is often just another name for a master. All their abject compliances earned them only a toleration of their laws.

The tyrannies of Philip, on the throne of Macedon, provoked new alliances among the Greeks. The Achaeans were weakened by internal dissensions and by the revolt of one of its members, Messene, but they joined the Aetolians and Athenians in opposition. However, they were unequal to the undertaking and once more had to resort to the dangerous expedient of help from foreign arms. The Romans were invited and eagerly accepted. Philip was conquered. Macedon was subdued.

A new crisis ensued to the league. The Roman fostered dissensions broke out among its members. Popular leaders became mercenary instruments for manipulating their countrymen. To nourish discord and disorder, the Romans proclaimed universal liberty* throughout Greece, much to the astonishment of those who trusted their sincerity. With the same insidious views, they reduced members from the league by appealing to their pride, highlighting the violation it committed on their sovereignty. Because of these tactics, this union, the last hope of Greece and the last hope of ancient liberty, was torn into pieces. Such imbecility and distraction reigned that the Roman army easily completed the ruin that their intrigues had begun. The Achaeans were cut to pieces and Achaia loaded with chains under which it groans at this hour.

Shows Federal Government Tends Towards Anarchy, Not Tyranny

19 I do not think an outline of this important portion of history is superfluous. It teaches several lessons. And, as a supplement to the outlines of the Achaean constitution, it emphatically illustrates the tendency of federal bodies more towards anarchy among the members than to tyranny in the head.

Number 19

Current Confederacies: German, Polish, Swiss

The examples of ancient confederacies cited in my last paper have not exhausted the sources of instruction on the subject. Some existing institutions, founded on a similar principle, merit particular consideration. The first is the Germanic body.

History of Germany

2 In the early ages of Christianity, seven distinct nations occupied Germany with no common chief. After conquering the Gauls, the Franks established the kingdom named for them. (c. 418)

In the ninth century, its warlike monarch, Charlemagne, carried his victorious arms in every direction. Germany became part of his vast dominions. On the dismemberment under his sons, Germany became a separate, independent empire.

Charlemagne and his immediate descendants possessed both power and the dignity of imperial power. But the principal vassals, whose lands became hereditary and who composed the national assembly, which Charlemagne had not abolished, gradually threw off the yoke and moved towards sovereign jurisdiction and independence. The imperial sovereignty was unable to restrain such powerful dependents or preserve the unity and tranquility of the empire. Furious private wars, accompanied by every type of calamity, raged between different princes and states.

Unable to maintain public order, the imperial authority declined by degrees until anarchy agitated during the long interval between the death of the last emperor of the German province of Swabia and the first emperor of Austria.

In the eleventh century the emperors held full sovereignty; in the fifteenth, they were only symbols and decorations of power.

Structure German Federal Authority: Legislative, Executive, Judiciary

3 The feudal system had many important features of a confederacy. The federal system that constitutes the German empire grew from it.

An assembly, the diet, representing the component members of the confederacy, holds its legislative power. The emperor, who is the executive magistrate, has veto power over the decrees of the assembly. The two judiciary tribunals, the imperial chamber and the aulic council, have supreme jurisdiction in controversies concerning the empire or among its members.

Legislative Authorities

4 The assembly has general legislating power for the empire, making war and peace, contracting alliances, assessing quotas for troops and money, constructing fortresses, regulating coins, admitting new members, and punishing disobedient members by removing sovereign rights and forfeiture of possessions.

Member State Restrictions

Members of the confederacy are expressly restricted from entering into compacts prejudicial to the empire, imposing tolls and duties on interstate commerce without the consent of the emperor and assembly, altering the value of money, doing injustice to one another, or giving assistance or retreat to disturbers of the public peace. And violators of these restrictions are subject to the above stated punishment.

Judiciary

Members of the diet, as such, are to be judged by the emperor and the assembly and, as private citizens, by the aulic council and imperial chamber.

Emperor: Duties, Rights

5 The emperor has numerous prerogatives. The most important are: an exclusive right to propose legislation to the assembly, veto its resolutions, name ambassadors, confer dignities and titles, fill vacant electorates, found universities, grant privileges not injurious to the states of the empire, receive and apply public revenues, and generally watch over the public safety.

In certain cases, the electors form a council to the emperor. As emperor, he possesses no territory within the empire nor receives any revenue for his support. But his revenue and dominions, in other qualities, constitute him one of the most powerful princes in Europe.

Federal Government; Sovereign Members

6 This set of constitutional powers of the representatives and head of this confederacy suggests that it must be an exception to the general character of similar systems. Nothing could be further from the reality. The fundamental principle on which it rests--that the empire is a community of sovereigns, that the assembly represents sovereigns, and that the laws are addressed to sovereigns renders the empire a nerveless body. It couldn't regulate its members or secure against external dangers. Unceasing fermentations agitated its bowels.

Internal Battles, Invasions, Misery

7 The history of Germany is a history of wars. Wars between the emperor and the princess and states. Wars among the princes and states. Its history includes the licentiousness of the strong and oppression of the weak. Foreign invasions and intrigues. Requisitions of money and men are largely disregarded and enforcement attempts have been either aborted or accompanied by slaughter of the innocent with the guilty. Its a history of general imbecility, confusion, and misery.

Constant Civil War

8 In the sixteenth century, the emperor, supported by part of the empire, fought other princes and states. The emperor had to flee from one conflict after nearly being made prisoner by the Elector of Saxony. The late king of Prussia fought his imperial sovereign more than once, usually defeating him.

Controversies and wars among members were so common that German annals are crowded with bloody descriptions.

Before the peace of Westphalia (1648), thirty years of war desolated Germany. The emperor with one half the empire opposed Sweden and the other half. Foreign powers finally negotiated and dictated the peace. Peace treaty articles became a fundamental part of the German constitution.

Crises Don't Pacify Internal Conflict

9 If the nation happens to unite in self-defense during an emergency, its situation is still deplorable. Military preparations must be preceded by so many tedious assembly discussions--inflamed by jealousies, pride, separate views, and clashing pretensions of sovereign bodies--that enemy troops are in the field before the assembly settles the military counter-strategy. And the enemy is retiring into winter quarters before federal troops are prepared to fight.

Army Inadequate, Underpaid

10 The small body of national troops judged necessary in peacetime is poorly maintained, badly paid, infected with local prejudices, and supported by irregular and disproportionate contributions to the treasury.

Districts Wage Constant Civil War

11 Because maintaining order and dispensing justice among sovereign subjects was impossible, the empire was divided into nine or ten circles or districts. They had interior organization and were authorized to use the military to enforce laws against delinquent and disobedient members.

This experiment fully demonstrates the radical vice of the constitution. Each circle is the miniature picture of the deformities of this political monster. They either fail to execute their commissions or do it with all the devastation and carnage of civil war. Sometimes whole circles default, increasing the mischief they were established to remedy.

Internal Military Coercion

12 We may judge the use of military coercion from an example presented by Thuanus. In Donawerth, a free and imperial city within the Swabian circle, the Abbe de St. Croix enjoyed certain reserved immunities. While exercising them on some public occasions, the people of the city committed outrages on him. In consequence, the city was put under the ban of the empire.

The director of another district, the Duke of Bavaria, obtained an appointment to enforce it. He arrived in the city with 10,000 troops to forcefully revive and move on an antiquated claim that the city had been stolen from his ancestors' territory. He took possession of it in his own name, disarmed and punished the inhabitants, and reannexed the city to his domain.

Weakness, Foreign Danger Promotes Status Quo

13 What has kept this disjointed machine from completely falling apart? The answer is obvious: most members are weak and unwilling to expose themselves to the mercy of the formidable foreign powers around them. The emperor derives vast weight and influence from his own hereditary properties, so he wants to preserve a system that is tied with his family pride and makes him the first prince of Europe.

These circumstances support a feeble and precarious Union. The nature of sovereignty includes a repellent quality, which time strengthens, preventing any reform by consolidation.

Even if this obstacle could be surmounted, neighboring powers would not allow a revolution because it would give the empire the force and preeminence to which it is entitled. Foreign nations are interested in any changes made to the German constitution and, on various occasions, their policy of perpetuating its anarchy has been evident.

Poland: Government Over Sovereigns

14 There are more examples. Poland, a government over local sovereigns, might be noticed. It gives striking proof of the calamities flowing from institutions that are equally unfit for self-government and self-defense. Poland has long been at the mercy of its powerful neighbors who recently, and graciously, disburdened it of one-third of its people and territories.

Swiss States Not Confederacy

15 The connection between the Swiss states can scarcely be called a confederacy, even though it is sometimes cited as an example of the stability of such institutions.

Swiss States: No Common Sovereignty

16 They have no common treasury, no common armies even in war, no common coin, no common judicatory, nor any other common mark of sovereignty

League's Unifying Features

17 They are kept together by their geographic location, their individual weakness and insignificance, the fear of powerful neighbors (one formerly ruled them), by the few contentions among the basically homogeneous manners, by their joint interest in their dependent possessions, by mutual aid for suppressing insurrections and rebellions, and by some regular and permanent provision for solving disputes among the states.

To settle disputes, each party involved chooses four judges from neutral states who, in case of disagreement, choose an umpire. Under the oath of impartiality, this tribunal pronounces a definitive sentence that all the states are bound to enforce. This regulation's effectiveness may be estimated by a clause in their treaty of 1683 with Victor Amadeus of Savoy. In it, he is obliged to interpose as mediator in disputes between states and employ force, if necessary, against the disobedient party.

Controversies Easily Severed League

18 Comparing their case to the United States confirms our opinion. However effective the union may be in ordinary cases, as soon as severe differences appeared, it failed. In three instances, religious controversies have kindled violent and bloody contests that severed the league.

The Protestant and Catholic states established separate assemblies where the most important concerns are adjusted, leaving the general assembly little business other than to take care of common bailages.

Opposing Foreign Alliances

19 The consequence of that separation merits attention. It produced opposite alliances with foreign powers. Berne, the head of the Protestant association, is allied with the United Provinces. Luzerne, head of the Catholic association, with France.

* This was but another name more specious for the independence of the members on the federal head. Publius

Number 20

United Netherlands: Failure of Legislation for States

The United Netherlands is an interesting confederacy of aristocracies, yet it confirms the lessons derived from others we have reviewed.

Equal States; Equal, Independent Cities

2 The United Netherlands has seven equal sovereign provinces. Each province is composed of equal, independent cities. In all important issues, both the provinces and the cities must be unanimous.

States-General: Terms Vary Widely

3 The sovereignty of the union is represented by the States-General, consisting usually of about 50 deputies appointed by the provinces. They hold their seats, some for life and some for one, three, or six years. From two provinces, their appointment continues at the state's pleasure.

Authorities of States-General

4 The States-General can enter into treaties and alliances, make war and peace, raise armies and equip fleets, determine quotas and quotes, and demand contributions. In each case, however, unanimity and the sanction of their constituents are requisite.

They have authority to appoint and receive ambassadors, execute treaties and alliances already formed, provide for collection of duties on imports and exports, regulate the mint with a saving to the provincial rights, and govern the dependent territories as sovereigns.

Without general consent, the provinces are restrained from entering into foreign treaties and establishing duties injurious to others or higher than that charged their own subjects.

A council of state and a chamber of accounts, with five colleges of admiralty, aid and fortify the federal administration.

Stadholder: National Executive and Provincial Ruler

5 The stadholder (executive magistrate of the United Provinces of the Netherlands) is a hereditary prince. His principal weight and influence derive from his independent title, his family connections with some of the chief potentates of Europe, and, most of all, his being stadholder (viceroy, governor) in several provinces in addition to the union.

As a provincial stadholder, he appoints town magistrates under certain regulations, executes provincial decrees, presides when he pleases in the provincial tribunals, and has throughout the power of pardon.

Stadholder: Authorities

6 As stadholder of the union, he has considerable prerogatives.

Political Executive

7 In his political capacity, he settles disputes between provinces when other methods fail, assists at the deliberations of the States-General and their particular conferences, meets with foreign ambassadors, and keeps agents for his particular affairs at foreign courts.

Military Commander

8 In his military capacity, he commands the federal troops, provides for posts and garrisons in fortified towns, and confers military ranks.

Naval Admiral-General

9 In his marine capacity, he is admiral-general. He directs everything relative to naval forces and affairs, presides in the admiralties in person or by proxy, appoints lieutenant-admirals and other offices, and establishes councils of war, whose decisions are not executed until he approves them.

Salary; Standing Army

10 His revenue, exclusive of his private income, amounts to 300,000 florins. The standing army he commands has about 40,000 men.

Theoretical Organization Only; In Reality, Chaos

11 This is the nature of the celebrated Belgic confederacy as spelled out on paper. How has it functioned in reality? Imbecility in the government. Discord among provinces. Foreign influence and indignities. Precarious existence in peace and the calamities accompanying war.

Hatred Keeps Netherlands Whole

12 Grotius remarked, long ago, that nothing but the hatred of his countrymen to the house of Austria kept them from being ruined by the vices of their constitution.

Jealousy Among Provinces

13 Another respectable writer says the union has enough authority in the States-General to secure harmony, but jealousy in each province renders reality very different from theory.

Inland Provinces Can't Pay Taxes

14 Another says the constitution obliges each province to levy contributions. But this article never could, and probably never will, be executed because inland provinces, which have little commerce, cannot pay an equal quota.

Provinces Use Military to Extract Tax Quotas From Each Other

15 In practice, the articles of the constitution relating to contribution are waived. The consenting provinces are obliged to furnish their quota without waiting for the others, then obtain reimbursement from the others anyway they can. The great wealth and influence of Holland enable her to do both.

16 More than once, deficiencies were ultimately collected at bayonet point. Although practical, this is a dreadful solution in a confederacy where one member is stronger than the rest and several are too small to offer any resistance. And this solution is utterly impractical in a confederacy composed of several members of equal strength, resources, and defenses.

Foreign Ministers Overstep Authority

17 Former foreign minister Sir William Temple says foreign ministers avoid matters taken ad referendum by tampering with the provinces and cities. In 1726, the treaty of Hanover was delayed this way for a year. Similar instances are numerous and notorious.

States-General Oversteps Authority

18 In critical emergencies, the States-General are often compelled to overstep their constitutional bounds. In 1688, they concluded a treaty themselves at the risk of their heads. In 1648, the treaty of Westphalia, formalizing their independence, concluded without the consent of Zealand. Even as recently as the last peace treaty with Great Britain, the constitutional principle of unanimity was ignored.

Weak Constitution Leads to Tyranny

A weak constitution must end in dissolution either from a deficiency in power or the usurpation of powers necessary for the public safety. Whether the usurpation, when once begun, will stop at a healthy point or go forward to a dangerous extreme, depends on the circumstances at the time. Tyranny more frequently grows out of the assumptions of power needed in an emergency by a defective constitution, than out of the full exercise of the largest constitutional authorities.

Stadholder Holds Confederacy Together

19 Despite the calamities produced by the stadholdership, it has been assumed that without his influence in individual provinces, the causes of anarchy manifest in the confederacy would have dissolved it long ago.

The Abbe Mably says under such a government, the Union could not have survived without a motivator from within the provinces, capable of quickening their tardiness and compelling them to the same way of thinking. This motivator is the stadholdership.

Sir William Temple said that during vacancies in the stadholdership, Holland, with her riches and authority, drew others into dependence, supplying the role.

Surrounding Nations Influence Both Unity and Corruption

20 Other circumstances have also controlled the tendency to anarchy and dissolution. The surrounding foreign powers make union absolute necessity. At the same time, their intrigues nourish the constitutional vices, keeping the republic to some degree always at their mercy.

Can't Agree How to Fix Problems

21 True patriots have long bewailed the fatal tendency of these vices and have convened four extraordinary assemblies for the special purpose of finding a remedy. But even with their enthusiasm, they have found it impossible to unite the public councils in reforming the known, acknowledged, fatal evils or the existing constitution.

Let us pause for one moment, my fellow citizens, over this melancholy and monitory lesson of history. Let's shed a tear for the calamities brought on mankind by their adverse opinions and selfish passions. Then let our combined praise of gratitude for the auspicious amity distinguishing our political counsels rise to Heaven.

Federal Tax Plan Failed

22 A design establishing a general tax administered by the federal government was also conceived. It had adversaries and also failed.

Maybe Crises Will Form Stronger Union

23 This unhappy people seem to currently suffer from popular convulsions, dissentions among states, and foreign invasion, crises that will determine their destiny. The eyes of all nations are fixed on the awful spectacle.

Humanity's first wish is that this severe trial will create a governmental revolution that will strengthen their union, making it the parent of tranquillity, freedom, and happiness. Our next wish is that the speed with which our country secures these blessings will comfort them after the catastrophe of their own.

Fatal Flaw:Government Governing Government

24 I don't apologize for dwelling so long on the study of these federal precedents. Experience is the oracle of truth. When its lessons are unambiguous, they should be regarded as absolutely conclusive.

The important truth that experience unequivocally pronounces in this present case is that just as a sovereignty over sovereigns, a government over governments, a legislation for communities--as distinguished from a government over individuals--is illogical in theory, in practice it subverts order and ends civility by substituting violence in place of law, or the destructive coercion of the sword in place of the mild and solitary coercion of the magistracy.

Publius

Weaknesses That Doomed Ancient Greek Confederacies